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INTRODUCTION 
Recent domestic legislation is blurring the line between securities regula-
tion and human rights law. Securities law has traditionally regulated corpo-
rate disclosure on financial information, such as income statements and 
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investment risks. By contrast, human rights law has traditionally operated 
in the international sphere and focused on state obligations.  
That all changed in 2010 with the adoption of  the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), which 
includes sections 1502 and 1504 on non-financial disclosure related to 
human rights and anti-corruption.1 Section 1502 imposes a new reporting 
requirement on publicly traded companies that manufacture products us-
ing certain conflict minerals.2 Companies must identify whether the sourc-
ing of  the minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of  Congo 
(DRC) and bordering countries. If  so, they must submit an independent 
private sector audit report on due diligence measures taken to determine 
whether those conflict minerals directly or indirectly financed or benefited 
armed groups in the covered countries.3 Section 1504 requires natural re-
sources companies to disclose certain payments made to governments for 
the commercial development of  oil, natural gas, or minerals.4 This provi-
sion reinforces the global standard outlined by the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, a multi-stakeholder coalition that promotes reve-
nue transparency through government legislation.5 
Sections 1502 and 1504 were highly contested at their adoption and re-
main controversial. Since August 2012, when the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) released new rules implementing these provisions, the 
U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, Business Roundtable, and industry groups 
filed petitions in U.S. courts to modify or nullify the two rules.6 While sec-
                                                          
1. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 911, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
2. Id. § 1502 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012)). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. § 1504 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2012)).  
5. For more information on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, see EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). See also Peter 
Eigen, Fighting Corruption in a Global Economy: Transparency Initiatives in the Oil and Gas Industry, 29 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327 (2007); Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications 
of  the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37 (2008); Virginia 
Haufler, Disclosure as Governance: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Resource Management in 
the Developing World, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 53 (2010). 
6. On October 10, 2012, the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, the 
Independent Petroleum Association of  America, and the National Foreign Trade Council filed law-
suits against the SEC over its resource extraction rule (1504) in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of  Columbia (Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1668, 2013 WL 3307114 (D.D.C. July 2, 
2013)) and the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 
1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). On October 19, 2012, another lawsuit was filed by the National Association 
of  Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, and Business Roundtable in the U.S. Court of  
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit requesting that the conflict minerals rule (1502) be modified or nullified. 
Brief  of  Petitioners, Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.nam.org/~/media/B5825277D7C144A48C2C4442054900D4/NAM_v_SEC_brief_onl
y_01162013.pdf. After the Circuit Court ruled in the case involving section 1504 that jurisdiction 
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tion 1502 survived court challenge, the U.S. District Court of  the District 
of  Columbia vacated section 1504 on July 2, 2013.7 The court held that 
Congress did not intend for extractive companies’ annual reports of  pay-
ments to foreign governments be publicly disclosed. Rather, the SEC had 
discretion to allow issuers to disclose payment information confidentially 
to the SEC, which could then make public a compilation of  certain infor-
mation. The court further found that the SEC’s denial of  an exemption 
from disclosing payments to those governments whose local laws prohib-
ited such disclosure was arbitrary and capricious. Since the SEC has elected 
not to appeal this decision, it is now in the process of  promulgating a re-
vised rule that would take the court’s decision into account.8 
As part of  this litigation, business groups have challenged the economic 
costs associated with sections 1502 and 1504, costs that have been 
acknowledged even by proponents of  the provisions. But more important-
ly, opponents fear that the legislation forces the SEC to reach beyond its 
mandate to meet humanitarian goals. According to SEC Commissioner 
Daniel M. Gallagher: 
Section 1502 is about curtailing violence in the DRC; it is not about 
investor protection, promoting fair and efficient markets, or capital 
formation. Warlords and armed criminals need to fund their nefari-
ous operations. Their funding is their lifeline; it’s a chokepoint that 
should be cut off. That is a perfectly reasonable foreign policy ob-
jective. But it’s not an objective that fits anywhere within the SEC’s 
threefold statutory mission.9 
Commissioner Gallagher fears that securities regulation is being used to 
achieve foreign policy goals that are outside the SEC’s mission of  investor 
                                                                                                                                      
resided with the lower court (Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013)), the plain-
tiffs opposing rule 1502 requested transfer of  the case to the District Court. Petitioner’s Motion to 
Transfer, Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 12-1422 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.conflictmineralslaw.com/files/2013/04/Motion-to-Transfer.pdf 
7. With regard to section 1502, the U.S. District Court for the District of  Columbia denied the 
plaintiffs’ request for summary judgment and upheld the rule in its entirety. Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. v. 
SEC, No. 13-cv-635, 2013 WL 3803918 (D.D.C. July 23, 2013), available at 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0635-37. With regard to section 
1504, the District Court vacated the rule and remanded to the SEC for further proceedings. Am. 
Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1668, 2013 WL 3307114 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013), available at 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2012cv1668-51. 
8. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Won’t Appeal Ruling Vs Disclosing Payments Abroad, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 
2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-sec-resource-extraction-
idUSBRE9820Z820130903. 
9. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule to Im-
plement Section 1502 of  the Dodd–Frank Act — the “Conflict Minerals” Provision (Aug. 22, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212dmg-minerals.htm. 
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protection, the promotion of  fair and efficient markets, and capital for-
mation.  
In fact, the Dodd–Frank provisions are but one example of  an emerg-
ing trend in international securities law. Over the past decade, an increasing 
number of  governments and securities exchanges have passed mandatory 
regulations on corporate disclosure of  social issues.10 These laws have 
primarily required companies to issue corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reports, which include qualitative information and quantitative indicators 
on companies’ social and environmental performance. Yet the Dodd–
Frank provisions go one step further by codifying a due diligence ap-
proach to human rights-related issues. Section 1502 is the first regulation 
to create binding rules on due diligence with regard to a company’s supply 
chain. Section 1504 is an anti-corruption initiative that requires extractive 
companies to disclose payments to foreign governments. It represents an 
effort to enhance good governance and sustainable development through 
a more accountable system for the management of  natural resource 
wealth. 
Why have human rights advocates and policymakers targeted securities 
regulation and other corporate law to achieve corporate accountability? 
The primary reason is the lack of  effectiveness of  existing mechanisms, 
including international standards and litigation strategies. International, 
regional, and non-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO), have drafted standards and principles 
addressed to companies (e.g., the UN Global Compact and ISO 26000) 
and governments (e.g., OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of  Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises and Social Policy).11 These voluntary instruments, how-
ever, lack independent monitoring, implementation, and enforcement 
mechanisms; do not include performance metrics to assess compliance; 
and are not certifiable.12 While the Alien Tort Claims Act has been an im-
                                                          
10. See infra Part I.A. 
11. See generally UN Global Compact (2000), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html; Int’l Labor Org. 
[ILO], Tripartite Declaration of  Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf; Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], ISO 
26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility (2010), available at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546. 
12. See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of  Human Rights Re-
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portant tool to hold companies liable for human rights violations, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently limited the act’s exterritorial application.13 Advo-
cates are seeking alternative domestic mechanisms that have more teeth 
and can facilitate the incorporation of  human rights norms into company 
operations. 
In this Article, I take a step back from these recent developments to an-
alyze a critical question: Is securities regulation the appropriate mechanism 
for achieving human rights compliance? By doing so, I seek to open a dia-
logue between two disparate streams of  scholarship in private and public 
law and propose policy recommendations for effectively furthering the 
movement towards corporate accountability. While existing literature on 
sections 1502 and 1504 addresses the history of  the legislation and cri-
tiques its efficacy, the main contribution of  the Article is to analyze the 
normative implications of  the broader strategy of  using securities regula-
tion to hold companies accountable for human rights abuses.14 
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I reviews comparative law to 
identify an emerging trend toward non-financial disclosure. In Part II, I 
analyze this trend by focusing on the debate over sections 1502 and 1504 
in the Dodd–Frank Act. As I demonstrate, human rights advocates, com-
panies, and investors disagree over the legislation as well as the broader 
question of  whether securities law should regulate human rights compli-
ance. In Part III, I argue that securities law is an innovative strategy that 
has the potential to significantly further the movement for corporate ac-
countability, but only if  framed appropriately. Mandatory disclosure rules 
can provide teeth to international human rights norms and operationalize 
them into the day-to-day decision-making of  companies. I also establish 
that human rights risks are material for investors and that there are long-
term costs to companies of  not reporting, including reputational damage 
that can affect a company’s share price and the denial of  a social license to 
operate by host governments. Yet because of  compliance costs and the 
                                                                                                                                      
sponsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004); John Gerard Ruggie, 
Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007). 
13. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). The Alien Tort Claims Act 
allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of  the law of  nations . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).  
14. For a detailed analysis and critique of  section 1502, see Christiana Ochoa & Patrick Keenan, 
Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of  United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129 (2011); Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2012); Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New 
Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2012). For a discussion on 
section 1504, see Brandon Carl Berns, Will Oil and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity Markets in Response to 
Section 1504 of  the Dodd–Frank Act? Can They Afford Not To?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 758 (2011); 
Daniel M. Firger, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Examining the New Extraterritorial Infor-
mation Forcing Rules in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act of  2010, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1043 (2010). 
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high bar set by courts for economic analysis in rulemaking, section 1502 is 
not a good model for more expanded human rights disclosure at the SEC. 
The agency should instead issue interpretive guidance to clarify companies’ 
existing obligations to disclose human rights-related material risks. In the 
conclusion, I recommend international regulatory convergence to relieve 
possible damage to a company’s competitive advantage due to increased 
costs associated with social disclosure.  
I. NON-FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
One of  the main goals of  securities law is to ensure that investors have 
accurate information about companies and that prospective purchasers can 
make reasoned decisions about the value of  securities under considera-
tion.15 Regulations outline which information publicly traded companies 
must regularly provide to the public. Traditionally, such information has 
been strictly financial: through the disclosure of  balance sheets, income 
statements, and cash flows, investors can determine sales, operating in-
come, total assets, or other indicators of  financial performance.16 Yet there 
has been an emerging trend in securities law to incorporate disclosure of 
non-financial information, including human rights. 
A. Mandatory Regulations on Corporate Sustainability Reporting 
Over the past decade, an increasing number of  governments have 
passed mandatory regulations on corporate disclosure of  sustainability 
performance, including social issues. These laws typically require reporting 
based on social and environmental indicators, the most prominent of  
which are produced by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).17 According 
to a 2010 report, there were 142 country standards that include a sustaina-
bility-related reporting requirement or guidance.18 Two-thirds of  those 
regulations are mandatory, and a number of  them explicitly cite GRI 
guidelines.19 According to a recent study using data from fifty-eight coun-
                                                          
15. See Securities Act of  1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2006); Securities Exchange Act of  1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–nn (2006). 
16. See Securities Exchange Act of  1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006). 
17. The Global Reporting Initiative is a private regulatory body that has produced the leading 
standard for corporate sustainability reporting. Created in 1997, the GRI guidelines include seventy-
nine indicators on which corporations report on their social, environmental, and economic perfor-
mance. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of  Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 
53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575 (2013). 
18. U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME ET AL., CARROTS AND STICKS — PROMOTING TRANS-
PARENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY: AN UPDATE ON TRENDS IN VOLUNTARY AND MANDATORY AP-
PROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 4 (2010). 
19. Id. 
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tries, mandatory disclosure of  sustainability information has significant 
consequences on socially responsible managerial practices.20 
European countries, in particular, are at the forefront of  the movement 
for corporate disclosure on social and environmental performance. 
France’s 2001 New Economic Regulations Act requires all listed compa-
nies to report on forty social and environmental criteria in their annual 
reports.21 The Swedish government requires state-owned enterprises to 
issue sustainability reports in accordance with GRI’s guidelines and subject 
to external assurance.22 Spain similarly enacted legislation that requires 
state-owned companies and businesses with over 1000 employees to pro-
duce sustainability reports beginning in 2012.23 As of  2009, Denmark re-
quires disclosure of  CSR activities in financial statements by both state-
owned companies and companies with total assets of  more than 19 million 
euros, revenues more than 38 million euros, and more than 250 employ-
ees — totaling about 1100 companies.24 In addition, Denmark’s mandate 
extends to institutional investors, investment associations, and other listed 
financial businesses.25 The guidance notes to Denmark’s amended Finan-
cial Statements Act encourage the use of  GRI guidelines to fulfill the re-
porting requirement.26  
Many other EU countries have adopted similar voluntary guidelines to 
implement the EU Modernization Directive on corporate disclosure of  
non-financial information. Existing EU law mandates private companies to 
include non-financial key performance indicators in their annual reports 
“where appropriate” and “[t]o the extent necessary for an understanding 
of  the company’s development, performance or position.”27 The Europe-
an Commission is considering improvements to this policy because the 
                                                          
20. See, e.g., Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of  Mandatory Corporate Sustaina-
bility Reporting (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-100, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1799589. 
21. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM] art. L225-102-1 (Fr.). 
22. Regeringskansliet, Ministry of  Enterprise, Energy, & Communications, Guidelines for External 
Reporting by State-Owned Companies (2007) (Swed.), available at 
http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/09/41/25/56b7ebd4.pdf. 
23. Sustainable Economy Law (B.O.E. 2011, 2). 
24. Danish Financial Statements Act, § 99a (2008) (Den.). The Danish law follows a principle of  
“report or explain,” which requires companies to either disclose their CSR activities or give reasons 
for not having any. 
25. Id. 
26. DANISH COMMERCE AND COMPANIES AGENCY, REPORTING ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY — AN INTRODUCTION FOR SUPERVISORY AND EXECUTIVE BOARDS 15 (2009). 
27. Council Directive 2003/51/EC, of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  18 June 
2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the 
Annual and Consolidated Accounts of  Certain Types of  Companies, Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, art. 1(14), 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16. 
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requirements for disclosure are unclear and EU member states can choose 
to exempt small and medium-sized enterprises.28  
Sustainability reporting is becoming increasingly mandatory in Asian 
countries as well. For instance, in 2011, India’s Securities and Exchange 
Board mandated listed companies to submit Business Responsibility Re-
ports, which describe measures taken along the key principles enunciated 
in the “National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Eco-
nomic Responsibilities of  Business.”29 This requirement is initially only 
applicable to the top 100 companies in terms of  market capitalization, and 
will later be phased in to apply to the remaining companies. China has re-
cently mandated similar guidelines for state-owned enterprises, requiring 
such entities to file CSR reports as of  2012.30 In 2007, Japan released its 
Environmental Reporting Guidelines, which cite GRI guidelines and re-
quire environmental reporting for specified corporations.31 
Stock exchanges are another important driving force behind non-
financial corporate disclosure. Companies listed on the London Stock Ex-
change must disclose in their annual reports any non-financial information 
relevant to their business, although they do not have to file a full-length 
CSR report.32 In Australia, companies listed on the national exchange must 
disclose the extent to which they have followed the Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations, which include sustainability issues.33 
Emerging market countries are also promoting voluntary standards in CSR 
reporting through the involvement of  local stock exchanges. All compa-
nies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are required to follow the 
King Report on Corporate Governance, which mandates integrated re-
                                                          
28. See, e.g., European Workshops on Disclosure of  Environmental, Social and Governance Information: Sum-
mary of  Discussions, at 16 (Feb. 25, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/reporting-disclosure/swedish-presidency/files/summaries/6-final_workshop_en.pdf. 
29. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Bd. of  India, SEBI Board Meeting, PR No. 145/2011 (Nov. 24, 
2011), http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/detail/22104/yes/PR-SEBI-Board-meeting. 
30. State-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of  the State Council (SASAC), Guidelines 
to the State-owned Enterprises Directly Under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities 
(2011) (China), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n13933222/14125651.html.  
31. Government of Japan Ministry of the Environment, Environmental Reporting Guidelines: Towards 
a Sustainable Society (Provisional Translation) 112 (2007) (Japan), available at 
http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/economy/erg2007.pdf; Law Concerning the Promotion of Busi-
ness Activities with Environmental Consideration by Specified Corporations, etc., by Facilitating 
Access to Environmental Information, and Other Measures (Provisional Translation), Law No. 77 of 
2004 (Japan), available at http://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/policy/business.pdf. 
32. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (U.K.). 
33. Australian Sec. Exch. Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Rec-
ommendations 5, 33–34 (2d ed. 2007). Disclosure under these recommendations is on an “if  not, why” 
basis.  
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porting that incorporates financial and non-financial information.34 Chi-
na’s Shanghai Stock Exchange encourages companies to file annual CSR 
reports and develop a CSR strategy, and provides incentives for doing so, 
such as priority election into the prestigious Shanghai Corporate Govern-
ance Sector.35 
B. Human Rights-Related Corporate Due Diligence Requirements  
As an alternative to stand-alone sustainability reporting, which remains 
voluntary in many countries including the United States, a human rights 
due diligence approach is evolving. John Ruggie, former UN Special Rep-
resentative on Business and Human Rights, has promoted the use of  due 
diligence by companies as part of  their responsibility to respect human 
rights.36 Ruggie’s framework, which was unanimously endorsed by the UN 
Human Rights Council, calls on states to require human rights due dili-
gence and outlines the steps that this process entails: “assessing actual and 
potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, 
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.”37 
Ruggie further notes that due diligence “should be ongoing, recognizing 
that the human rights risks may change over time as the business enter-
prise’s operations and operating context evolve.”38 By treating human 
                                                          
34. Inst. of  Dirs. S. Afr., King Code of  Governance for South Africa 10 (2009). For further information 
about integrated reporting, see ROBERT G. ECCLES & MICHAEL P. KRZUS, ONE REPORT: INTE-
GRATED REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY (2010). The GRI recently joined a group of  
professional accounting bodies, auditing firms, international organizations, companies, and non-
governmental organizations to form the International Integrated Reporting Committee, whose aim is 
to promote the adoption of  a global standard for integrated reporting among companies worldwide. 
See GRI and IIRC Deepen Cooperation to Shape the Future of  Corporate Reporting, INTEGRATED REPORT-
ING, http://www.theiirc.org/2013/03/01/gri-and-iirc-deepen-cooperation-to-shape-the-future-of-
corporate-reporting (last visited June 23, 2013).  
35. GUIDELINES ON ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE BY COMPANIES LISTED 
ON THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, 2008 (China). This policy has resulted in a twenty-one 
percent increase in the number of  listed companies disclosing their sustainability performance. See, 
e.g., Press Release, Global Reporting Initiative, Investing in a Sustainable Future: The Role of  the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in the Uptake of  Sustainability Reporting Initiatives in China (Sept. 5, 
2012), https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/Investing-in-a-
sustainable-future-The-role-of-the-Shanghai-Stock-Exchange-in-the-uptake-of-sustainability-
reporting-initiat.aspx. 
36. See, e.g., Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Human Rights, 
Report of  the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights].  
37. Id. ¶ 17. 
38. Id. 
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rights as business risks, the due diligence approach attempts to operation-
alize these norms into a company’s decision-making process. 
The justification behind a due diligence approach is that companies are 
already accustomed to applying this process to their other business activi-
ties. For instance, due diligence is required as part of  a company’s assess-
ment of  risks under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.39 This process in-
volves a company identifying actual or potential risks associated with its 
activities and relationships, and taking steps to mitigate those risks. Incor-
porating human rights into the due diligence process places the burden of  
proof  on companies rather than victims of  abuse.40 Critics have argued, 
however, that this approach limits human rights disclosure to material im-
pacts — that is, those impacts that may cause legal, reputational, or other 
business risks — and that reporting may not lead to changes in corporate 
behavior.41 Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to what a due dili-
gence process entails in the context of  human rights.  
Human rights-related due diligence was codified into legislation for the 
first time through the adoption of  section 1502 of  the Dodd–Frank Act, 
which promotes supply chain transparency.42 Section 1502 requires public 
companies that manufacture (or contract to manufacture) certain conflict 
minerals to disclose whether their minerals originate from the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo (DRC) or any one of  nine adjoining countries.43 Issu-
ers must conduct a “reasonable country of  origin inquiry” and publicly 
disclose if  their minerals originate in the DRC or adjoining countries.44 
                                                          
39. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977). This act extends extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to U.S. courts to enforce bribery charges, setting a precedent which has been followed in 
other countries such as the United Kingdom. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf. 
40. See Mark B. Taylor, Senior Researcher, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Defin-
ing Compliance: Why Recent Developments in Law and Policy Should Matter to the Corporate Ac-
countability Movement, Guest Remarks at the International Coalition Accountability Roundtable 
(Sept. 8–9, 2011), available at http://accountabilityroundtable.org/analysis-and-updates/defining-
compliance-why-recent-developments-in-law-and-policy-should-matter-to-the-corporate-
accountability-movement/. 
41. See, e.g., Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Summary Report, Expert Meeting on Corpo-
rate Law and Human Rights: Opportunities and Challenges of  Using Corporate Law to Encourage Corporations to 
Respect Human Rights, Corporate Law Tools Project 10 (Nov. 5–6, 2009), available at 
http://www.valoresociale.it/detail.asp?c=1&p=0&id=316. 
42. See infra Part II. 
43. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1502, 124 Stat. 2218 (2010). The provision defines “conflict minerals” as cassiterite (tin ore), co-
lumbite-tantalite (tantalum ore), wolframite (tungsten ore) and gold, and the nine adjoining countries 
include Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Ango-
la, Zambia, and Tanzania. Id. § 1502(e)(4). 
44. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,273 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249, 249b) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-
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The rule requires disclosure on a new form to be filed with the SEC 
(Form SD for specialized disclosure) as well as on their websites. If  the 
minerals do originate in the covered countries, companies must exercise 
due diligence on the source and chain of  custody of  their conflict minerals 
and file a Conflict Minerals Report as an exhibit to Form SD. Companies 
must also obtain an independent private sector audit of  the Conflict Min-
erals Report.45  
Not only are about 6000 publicly listed companies affected by section 
1502, but private companies that are suppliers to public companies may 
also be affected. What is particularly notable about the rule is that it en-
courages the use of  an emerging international standard for supply chain 
due diligence — the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of  Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.46 
Moreover, in 2011, California passed a law to incentivize compliance with 
section 1502.47 The bill prohibits companies in violation of  the disclosure 
requirements to contract with California’s state agencies.  
Another provision of  Dodd–Frank, section 1504, similarly addresses 
human rights-related issues.48 Section 1504 requires all listed oil, gas, and 
mining companies to disclose project-level payments to foreign govern-
ments for the commercial development of  natural resources.49 This rule 
enhances transparency and accountability on a critical human rights issue 
in developing countries: corruption. By depleting resources available for 
public spending, corruption disables a state from meeting its obligations to 
respect and protect the human rights of  its citizens. Section 1504 aims to 
                                                                                                                                      
12/pdf/2012-21153.pdf. According to the rule, the reasonable country of  origin inquiry “does not 
require an issuer to determine to a certainty that all its conflict minerals did not originate in the Cov-
ered Countries because the standard required is a reasonable inquiry, and requiring a certainty in this 
setting would not be reasonable and may impose undue costs.” Id. at 56,312–13. 
45. Id. 
46. OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of  Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en; 
see Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,281–82.  
47. S.B. 861, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
48. Section 1504 was co-authored by U.S. Senators Richard Lugar and Ben Cardin. The issue of  
revenue transparency in the extractive industry sector was first proposed in 2008 by Representative 
Barney Frank through H.R. 6066, the Extractive Industries Transparency in Disclosure Act. Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency in Disclosure Act, H.R. 6066, 110th Cong. (2008). Senator Charles 
Schumer introduced companion legislation, S. 3389, the Extractive Industries Transparency Disclo-
sure Act, in the Senate. Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure Act, S. 3389, 110th Cong. 
(2008). In 2009, Senators Lugar and Cardin introduced S. 1700, the Energy Security Through Trans-
parency Act, in the Senate. S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009). The movement for revenue transparency has 
been spearheaded by a coalition of  organizations, including Revenue Watch and Publish What You 
Pay. 
49. Non-de minimis payments (ones that equal or exceed $100,000) are to be annually disclosed 
to the SEC in a new form called Form SD. Disclosure must be made no later than 150 days after the 
end of  the fiscal year. 
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address the gap between a country’s substantial natural resource wealth 
and the extreme poverty among most of  its citizens. By requiring transpar-
ency in the financial dealings between governments and companies, sec-
tion 1504 enables enhanced public oversight and the reduction of  corrup-
tion. Furthermore, it complements the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), a voluntary stakeholder initiative that the United States 
has recently committed to implement.50 EITI compares what extractive 
companies pay governments with what governments say they receive. Sec-
tion 1504 builds on this framework by providing detailed information on 
countries that are not implementing EITI. In fact, Congress specifically 
referenced the EITI in its definition of  “payment” under section 1504.51 
The promotion of  supply chain due diligence and revenue transparency 
is not confined to the United States. Sections 1502 and 1504 are driving 
global norms on corporate accountability and serving as a guide for com-
parable legislation in other countries. In February 2012, the DRC passed a 
law requiring all mining and mineral trading companies operating in the 
country to undertake due diligence on all levels of  their supply chain ac-
cording to the OECD standard.52 In Canada, a conflict minerals act was 
introduced in the House of  Commons in March 2013 that would require 
Canadian companies to follow the OECD guidelines.53 The European 
Commission is also considering legislation that mirrors section 1502 and 
has recently launched a public consultation regarding a potential EU initia-
tive for responsible sourcing of  minerals from conflict-affected areas.54 
Following the model of  section 1504, the European Union issued a draft 
directive in 2011 requiring disclosure of  payments by oil, gas, and mining 
companies, including large private companies as well as companies listed 
on EU stock exchanges.55 In addition, in 2010, the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
                                                          
50. See sources cited supra note 5. 
51. Disclosure of  Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365, 56,376 (Sept. 
12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).  
52. See, e.g., Press Release, Global Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb Conflict 
Mineral Trade (May 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_cur
b_conflict_minerals_trade.pdf. 
53. Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-486, 41st Parl. (2013) (Can.), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/housepublications/publication.aspx?language=e&mode=1&docid=6062040&
file=4. 
54. See Public Consultation on a Possible EU Initiative on Responsible Sourcing of  Minerals Originating from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/?consul_id=174 (last visited Aug. 4, 2013); European Par-
liament Resolution of  15 December 2010 on the Future of  the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership Fol-
lowing the 3rd EU-Africa Summit, 2012 O.J. (C 169) 45; European Parliament Resolution of  7 July 
2011 on the Democratic Republic of  Congo and the Mass Rapes in the Province of  South Kivu, 
2013 O.J. (C 33) 198, 201. 
55. Commission Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council Amending Directive 
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change began requiring extractive companies to disclose payments to for-
eign governments; but unlike section 1504, disclosure is on a country-by-
country rather than project-level basis.56 Finally, the Canadian Parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development is 
considering regulations mandating disclosure of  oil, gas, and mineral com-
panies’ payments to the government.57  
II. THE DEBATE OVER DODD–FRANK SECTIONS 1502 AND 1504 
When evaluating the international regulatory developments on human 
rights disclosure and the potential of  sections 1502 and 1504 to serve as 
models for future rulemaking, we need to take a step back and analyze the 
debate over these laws. This debate illustrates divisions between and 
among stakeholders — including human rights advocates, companies, and 
investors — and provides lessons for whether, and how, securities law 
should regulate human rights compliance.  
A. Perspective of  Human Rights Advocates 
I begin with human rights advocates, who were among the primary ac-
tors who petitioned for the adoption of  the Dodd–Frank provisions. Hu-
man rights NGOs, including Oxfam, Global Witness, and Revenue Watch, 
have recently targeted securities regulation to achieve corporate accounta-
bility. This is part of  an international movement, which now focuses on 
lobbying the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada to pass 
similar legislation. The primary reason for using securities law is the inef-
fectiveness of  existing mechanisms for corporate accountability, including 
international standards and litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act. In-
ternational instruments are voluntary and lack monitoring and enforce-
ment mechanisms, while the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited the Alien 
Tort Statute’s extraterritorial application.58 
                                                                                                                                      
2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of  Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers 
Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, COM 
(2011) 683 final (Oct. 25, 2011). 
56. HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE, AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES GOVERNING THE LIST-
ING OF SECURITIES ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LIMITED 10 (2010), available at 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrulesup/Documents/mb96_miner.pdf. 
57. See Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 41st Parl., 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 
2012) (Can.), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=
1&DocId=5403234&File=0. In 2010, the Canadian Parliament tabled Bill C-571 on trade in conflict 
minerals. See Trade in Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-571, 40th Parl. (2010), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Bill=C571&Parl=40&Ses
=3. 
58. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1659 (2013).  
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Advocates are seeking alternative domestic mechanisms that have more 
teeth and are tied to corporate law. The benefits of  using securities law are 
numerous: it raises the profile of  human rights-related issues, establishes 
their link with a company’s financial performance, and facilitates more ef-
ficient compliance. According to its supporters, section 1502 can shape 
corporate behavior by requiring companies to monitor their supply chain 
for the financing of  conflict that helps fuel human rights abuses. By curb-
ing the illegitimate exploitation of  natural resources by state and non-state 
armed groups, it will also indirectly hinder financing of  the ongoing con-
flicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of  Congo. Section 1504 repre-
sents an effort to enhance good governance, anti-corruption, and sustain-
able development through a more accountable system for the management 
of  natural resource wealth. In addition, civil society groups could poten-
tially use the information disclosed under section 1504 to reveal company 
payments to governments and state security forces that commit human 
rights abuses. They can then pressure their governments for fairer spend-
ing on public development. 
Yet, in the case of  section 1502, there are possible unintended conse-
quences on communities, given the extensive requirements placed on 
companies and the idealistic goals that the legislation aims to achieve.59 
While the Congolese government has publicly expressed its support for 
section 1502 in a letter to the SEC, some critics (including local NGOs) 
have feared that the legislation will lead to an embargo of  the region which 
would “push[ ] people towards conflict rather than leading them towards 
peace.”60 Disengagement by corporate actors may then leave the regional 
mineral trade in the hands of  less responsible “black-market” operators. 
This situation suggests that section 1502 may go too far in trying to re-
solve a humanitarian crisis while “imped[ing] issuers’ ability to conduct 
business in the DRC region.”61 Given that the rule has only recently been 
released, it is still unclear what the long-term consequences will be on the 
Congolese economy.62 For the purpose of  this paper, I will assume that 
                                                          
59. See Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 14, at 147. 
60. Dominic Johnson, Killing the Economy in the Name of  Peace? The New US “Conflict Minerals” Legis-
lation for the DRC, POLE INSTITUTE (July 19, 2010), http://pole-institute.net/index.php/archive/144-
killing-the-economy-in-the-name-of-peace-the-new-us-conflict-minerals-legislation-for-the-drc; see 
also Amy Tsui, Dodd–Frank Conflict Minerals Rule Said Tantamount to Embargo on D.R. Congo, 43 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 916 (2011). I should note that there are also Congolese civil society groups that have 
welcomed the law. See Prince Kihangi Kyamwami, Secretary General, Statement to the Bureau of  
Study, Observation, and Coordination of  the Regional Development of  Walikale (Aug. 16, 2011), 
available at https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/images/bedewa-comment-on-dodd-frank-
act-16-aug-2011.pdf. 
61. Taylor, supra note 14, at 105. 
62. For a discussion of  section 1502’s positive effects on mining sector reform and local mining 
communities in the DRC, see The Unintended Consequences of  Dodd–Frank’s Conflict Minerals Provision 
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any negative local consequences are outweighed by the rule’s humanitarian 
intent, which is to prevent armed groups from benefiting from the trade 
of  conflict minerals.63 
B. Perspective of  Companies 
While there is a diversity of  perspectives among companies over the leg-
islation, the most prominent voices come from industry groups and the 
U.S. Chamber of  Commerce, which are largely critical of  sections 1502 
and 1504. With regard to section 1502, manufacturing and extractive com-
panies are supportive of  the underlying goal of  combating trade in conflict 
minerals, but they have a number of  concerns about the legislation. First 
and most important is the financial cost of  compliance, which the SEC 
has estimated to be at least $1 billion in initial compliance costs, and $200 
to $400 million in ongoing compliance costs.64 According to the National 
Association of  Manufacturers, expenses for complying with section 1502 
include the costs of  new or revised computer systems and software, evalu-
ation of  products and supply chain vendors, modification of  supplier con-
tracts, participation in industry-wide validation schemes, and independent 
third-party audits.65 Expenses attributed to complying with section 1504 
include revising accounting systems to provide information by project ra-
ther than just by reporting entity, integrating this information into current 
financial reporting and control systems, training local accountants to rec-
ord data consistent with reporting requirements, and negotiating agree-
ments with joint venture partners to permit such information to be col-
lected, analyzed, and disclosed.66 These costs would disproportionately 
                                                                                                                                      
Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy & Trade of  the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(statement of  Sophia Pickles, Global Witness), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba19-wstate-spickles-20130521.pdf. 
63. This position is corroborated by the U.S. Department of  State’s statement of  active support 
for the continued implementation of  section 1502 and the diffusion of  OECD Due Diligence Guid-
ance reporting norms. See ROBERT D. HORMATS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECON. 
GROWTH, ENERGY, & THE ENV’T, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATEMENT CONCERNING CONTINUED 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFLICT MINERALS DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 1502 OF 
THE DODD–FRANK ACT (2013), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2013/205465.htm. Addition-
ally, the EU recently decided to proceed with similar legislation, as announced at the OECD Forum 
on May 2–3, 2013. See Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Forum on Implementing Due Diligence in the 
3Ts and Gold Supply Chains, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/multistakeholder-forum-
may-2013.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).  
64. See, e.g., Disclosure of  Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,398, 
56,412. 
65. See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-69.pdf. 
66. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER ON SEC IM-
PLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1504 OF THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUM-
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affect small and medium-sized businesses, particularly with regard to sec-
tion 1502 since it lacks a de minimis exception for issuers using small 
amounts of  conflict minerals. 
A second concern is the absence of  definitions for what supply chain 
due diligence entails, as well as the scope and substance of  the auditing 
process. Some companies argue that due diligence results should be evalu-
ated according to a “reasonable care standard,” since 100% accuracy is not 
possible given the fluid nature of  supply chains.67 In particular, the chain 
of  custody requirement under section 1502 is exceedingly difficult to 
comply with because of  the length and complexity of  the global supply 
chain, where a purchaser may not have adequate leverage to force a suppli-
er to disclose material content. While the OECD framework is promising, 
it is relatively new (having been finalized in 2010) and is currently undergo-
ing an implementation program informed by multi-stakeholder dialogue.68 
Therefore, companies lack confidence that these processes are workable 
and have requested flexibility in the framework given the diversity of  com-
panies and products impacted.69 Furthermore, companies are uncertain 
about the auditing process, including its scope (e.g., whether the audit co-
vers only the Conflict Minerals Report or the entire supply chain due dili-
gence process), who would be qualified to conduct such an audit, and what 
needs to be included in the certification process.70 
Finally, some companies fear that the legislation will damage their com-
petitive position in relation to foreign competitors and may impact their 
business relationships with the countries in which they operate. Securities 
law applies only to publicly listed companies, so private and foreign com-
panies would not have to bear the costs. Moreover, disclosure laws may 
place a company in breach of  contracts or host government laws, thus fur-
ther putting them at a competitive disadvantage.71 In the case of  section 
                                                                                                                                      
ER PROTECTION ACT (EXTRACTIVE RESOURCE ISSUER DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS TO GOVERN-
MENTS) (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-52.pdf. 
67. See Letter from the Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-57.pdf; Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. to Mary L. Schapiro, 
supra note 65. 
68. See OECD, Implementation Programme for the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of  Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Long Term Governance Arrangement (Feb. 
2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/LongTermGovernanceArrangement.pdf. See 
also Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Implementing the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/implementingtheguidance.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
69. See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of  Mfrs. to Mary L. Schapiro, supra note 65. 
70. See Letter from the Info. Tech. Indus. Council to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-68.pdf. 
71. See Letter from the Am. Petroleum Inst. to Div. of  Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 
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1504, companies such as Royal Dutch Shell are concerned that foreign 
governments may legally prohibit disclosure of  payments that had been 
made to them, as they may view such payments as confidential, competi-
tively sensitive, or a security risk.72 In some cases, these prohibitions are 
included in contracts between companies and foreign governments. The 
legislation’s requirement to disclose payments would lead to renegotiation 
of  these contracts or, at worst, may force companies to withdraw from the 
U.S. capital markets. For those reasons, companies argue that sections 1502 
and 1504 operate against the SEC’s obligation to consider “whether [an] 
action will promote efficiency, competition and capital formation.”73 
Despite the overwhelming opposition by industry groups against sec-
tions 1502 and 1504, there are prominent companies that are supportive 
of  the legislation. For example, Newmont Mining and Statoil ASA have 
declared their support for section 1504. In addition, many electronics 
companies including Panasonic, General Electric, and Microsoft have 
backed section 1502 and distanced themselves from the views of  the U.S. 
Chamber of  Commerce and the National Association of  Manufacturers.74 
Many of  these companies, which oppose any efforts to overturn the legis-
lation, have already been participating in multi-stakeholder and industry 
initiatives aimed at supply chain transparency, including the Electronic In-
dustry Citizenship Coalition, the Global eSustainability Initiative, and the 
International Tin Research Institute’s Tin Supply Chain Initiative.75  
C. Perspective of  Investors 
The main concern with respect to investors is whether laws such as sec-
tions 1502 and 1504 provide material information or simply overload in-
vestors with data that is difficult to interpret.76 Corporate actors and regu-
lators have inserted themselves into this debate as they argue that the rules 
                                                                                                                                      
12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-27.pdf. 
72. See Letter from Royal Dutch Shell to Meredith Cross, Dir., Div. of  Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
disclosures/specializeddisclosures-33.pdf. 
73. See Securities Exchange Act of  1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2012). 
74. See Business & Human Rights, Electronics Companies’ Responses to Allegations that Their Industry 
Associations Undermine Conflict Minerals Legislation, CORP. SOC. RESP. WIRE (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:55 AM), 
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/34439-Electronics-Companies-Responses-to-Allegations-
That-Their-Industry-Associations-Undermine-Conflict-Minerals-Legislation. 
75. See ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY CITIZENSHIP COALITION, http://www.eicc.info/ (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2013); GLOBAL E-SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, http://gesi.org/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013); 
International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, INTERNATIONAL TIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
https://www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_zoo&task= item&item _id=2192& Itemid=189 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
76. See Letter from Royal Dutch Shell to Meredith Cross, supra note 72.  
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do not benefit investors. They are concerned that the SEC is straying from 
its mission and that any benefit to shareholders is outweighed by the con-
siderable compliance costs borne by companies. David Lynn, former 
Chief  Counsel of  the SEC’s Division of  Corporation Finance, decries the 
use of  securities regulation to achieve social and public policy goals, such 
as those in sections 1502 and 1504. Lynn argues that attempts “to utilize 
the public disclosure process to achieve ends other than to protect inves-
tors, to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate capital 
formation could risk overburdening both issuers and investors with costly 
disclosure requirements for information that is not material to any invest-
ment or voting decision.”77 
Interestingly, however, there are no publicly filed investor comments to 
the SEC that are critical of  sections 1502 or 1504. The only vocal investors 
in the debate over this legislation have been socially responsible investment 
groups and pension funds worth more than $1.2 trillion, who have voiced 
their strong support.78 They claim that the information disclosed will aid 
their risk analyses and help strengthen markets. According to these inves-
tors, due diligence is necessary for them to assess and mitigate companies’ 
human rights risk exposure. 
With regard to section 1504, investors have not had access to “suffi-
ciently detailed, audited, consistent, and comparable data regarding host 
government payments” to account for potential “regulatory, taxation, po-
litical, and reputational risks.”79 Such risks are material to decision-making 
by investment groups such as Calvert Investments, which asserts that dis-
closure under section 1504 “would be very useful in the accurate calcula-
tion of  cost curves that determine whether and for how long a project 
may remain economic.”80 According to socially responsible investors, exist-
ing disclosure of  revenues do not provide sufficiently quantified and de-
tailed information to determine a company’s exposure to such risks.81  
Investment groups have made similar observations regarding section 
1502. Trillium Asset Management, for instance, argues that the rule will 
both protect investors and have an effect on a significant public interest.82 
                                                          
77. David M. Lynn, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to 
Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 339 (2011).  
78. See Press Release, As You Sow, Investor Statement Regarding Conflict Minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.asyousow.org/publications/2009-01-
07%20-%20DRC%20Investor%20Sttmt.pdf. 
79. Letter from Calvert Asset Mgmt., Inc. & Soc. Inv. Forum to Meredith Cross, Dir., Div. of  
Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-
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80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. See, e.g., Letter from Trillium Asset Mgmt. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
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It will protect investors by “requiring a high level of  disclosure within a 
company’s supply chain, thereby allowing investors to evaluate supply 
chain policies and practices, make company to company comparisons, and 
calculate the level of  risk associated with conflict mineral sourcing.”83 It 
will also expose the potential reputational and financial risk to companies 
unknowingly sourcing conflict minerals that are funding the humanitarian 
crisis in the DRC.84 While investors acknowledge the compliance costs 
associated with the two Dodd–Frank provisions, they argue that those 
costs are outweighed by the benefits of  risk recognition and mitigation for 
both investors and resource extraction issuers. 
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR USING SECURITIES LAW TO  
ACHIEVE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
I argue that using securities law is an innovative strategy that has the po-
tential to further the movement for corporate accountability and human 
rights compliance, but only if  framed in the right manner. Carefully crafted 
securities regulation can bridge the translation gaps between the business 
and human rights communities, who hold divergent goals, are made up of  
distinct constituencies, and speak different languages. It can operationalize 
emerging international human rights norms through a domestic mecha-
nism with real teeth. Moreover, given the materiality of  human rights risks, 
securities regulation is an appropriate mechanism for conveying infor-
mation about these risks to investors.  
A. Operationalizing Human Rights Through Mandatory Regulations 
The time is ripe for corporate accountability through mandatory regula-
tions. Until recently, the movement for corporate social responsibility has 
largely focused on voluntary commitments. Companies embraced this ap-
proach as a means of  deflecting state regulation and expressing their good 
“corporate citizenship.”85 The UN Global Compact represents the down-
falls of  a voluntary approach, and the need for binding regulation.  
Launched in 2000, the UN Global Compact is a voluntary initiative to 
encourage companies to embrace ten principles on human rights, the envi-
ronment, labor, and anti-corruption.86 It currently boasts over 7000 corpo-
rate signatories in 145 countries around the world. Rather than serving as a 
                                                                                                                                      
Comm’n (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-
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83. Id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Archie B. Carroll, The Four Faces of  Corporate Citizenship, 100 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 1 (1998). 
86. See generally UN Global Compact, supra note 11. 
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regulatory instrument, the Global Compact aims to mainstream its princi-
ples among companies by sharing best practices, fostering dialogue and 
partnerships with civil society organizations, and promoting corporate self-
regulation. Yet this form of  soft law lacks independent monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, and has been criticized for being conceptually 
vague and difficult to implement.87 There is also a critique from within the 
United Nations. Maude Barlow, senior adviser on water issues to the Presi-
dent of  the UN General Assembly, called the Global Compact “bluewash-
ing in terms of  wrapping the United Nation’s good housekeeping seal of  
approval around corporate behaviors that we don’t think always change.”88 
This critique hurts not only the United Nations and human rights advo-
cates, but also those companies that sign on to the Global Compact be-
cause they are genuinely trying to change their behavior.  
While voluntary initiatives such as the Global Compact have been suc-
cessful in raising corporate awareness about CSR, they have failed to ade-
quately take into account the internationally-recognized responsibility of  
companies to respect human rights.89 The 2011 UN Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights, which was unanimously approved by the UN Human 
Rights Council, recognizes this responsibility and calls on states to enforce 
laws that require companies to address their human rights impacts.90 In 
particular, states should adopt financial reporting requirements that “clari-
fy that human rights impacts in some instances may be ‘material’ or ‘signif-
icant’ to the economic performance of  the business enterprise.”91  
Mandatory disclosure can create a level playing field and reduce any 
competitive disadvantage associated with a commitment to human rights. 
This form of  regulation can “provide information to the public to correct 
for information asymmetries,” “promote more informed consent or delib-
eration,” and “change the behavior of  the firm by making managers more 
aware of  and concerned about their organization’s social outputs.”92 Yet 
information disclosure also has its drawbacks. For instance, companies 
may disclose information but not change their actual practices. These laws 
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do not prohibit companies from engaging in particular activities but simply 
require companies to report on whether they do. Therefore the effective-
ness of  disclosure will depend on whether the information shapes the de-
cision-making of  investors, civil society advocates, and host state govern-
ments, who would then apply pressure on companies to improve their be-
havior. 
Securities regulation is the preferred form of  information disclosure for 
corporate human rights performance for a variety of  reasons. First, there 
are clear sanctions imposed on companies for not reporting. For instance, 
sections 1502 and 1504 require disclosure through a new Form SD that 
will be deemed filed under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 and will 
be subject to section 18 of  the Exchange Act, which deals with liability for 
any false or misleading statements.93 In contrast, another recent law on 
supply chain transparency — the 2010 California Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act — only requires disclosure on a company’s website.94 The ex-
clusive remedy for failure to comply with the law is an action brought by 
the Attorney General of  California for injunctive relief. It remains to be 
seen whether the act will be enforced through such a remedy. 
The second reason why securities regulation is more appropriate than 
other information disclosure regimes, such as the California legislation, is 
because financial disclosure rules communicate a link between human 
rights risks and financial performance. As I will discuss in the next section, 
the materiality of  certain human rights risks suggests that this information 
is important to investors and belongs in securities filings. Treating human 
rights risks as financial risks sends the message that these are issues that 
companies must pay attention to.  
The third and perhaps most important justification for using securities 
law is to facilitate the operationalizing of  human rights into the day-to-day 
decision-making of  companies. Securities law is the point of  entry into a 
firm’s operations, and part of  the culture of  a company is complying with 
these laws. Firms not only have an institutional structure for securities 
compliance within their legal departments, but they also use enterprise risk 
management technology systems that can easily accommodate the inclu-
sion of  additional risks.95 Human rights can be integrated into existing 
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software, which standardizes compliance across firms and their supply 
chains. In addition, technology can concretize a business process — in this 
case, the identification and mitigation of  human rights risks — and change 
corporate culture around that activity.  
B. The Materiality of  Human Rights Risks 
The most powerful argument for the inclusion of  human rights in secu-
rities filings is that they are material, based on the SEC’s definition of  what 
a reasonable investor would consider important in making an investment 
decision.96 This contention includes three components. First, a company’s 
human rights risks are relevant to the reasonable investor and necessary 
for the public interest, but are currently not publicly available. Second, ra-
ther than issue new rules, the SEC can interpret existing rules to provide 
transparency to investors and promote the public interest through corpo-
rate accountability. Third, there may be greater costs to companies in the 
long term from not reporting.  
There is a growing recognition that human rights risks could affect the 
value of  companies, and that investors should take them into account. So-
cially responsible investors (SRIs), who screen companies based on various 
social criteria, are no longer a fringe group. The SRI market in the United 
States includes more than $3 trillion in assets, which represents 12% of  the 
total assets under professional management.97 The SRI market has grown 
34% since 2005 and more than 380% since 1995.98 Yet interest in sustain-
ability issues is not restricted to SRIs. Institutional investors are also re-
questing data on the social and environmental impacts of  their invest-
ments. For example, the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) stated in its Global Principles of  Accountable Corporate Gov-
ernance:  
CalPERS believes that boards that strive for active cooperation be-
tween corporations and stakeholders will be most likely to create 
wealth, employment and sustainable economies. With adequate, ac-
curate and timely data disclosure of  environmental, social, and gov-
ernance practices, shareowners are able to more effectively make 
investment decisions by taking into account those practices of  the 
companies in which the Fund invests.99 
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In fact, there are more than 800 global investment institutions with $32 
trillion in assets that are signatories to the United Nation’s Principles for 
Responsible Investment, which promotes incorporation of  environmental, 
social, and governance issues in investment analysis and decision-making, 
as well as disclosure of  those issues in annual financial reports.100  
As investors select their portfolios, they need the requisite information 
to assess companies’ exposure to material risks, including potential liability 
from lawsuits or government action, as well as damage to a company’s 
reputation should there be a credible allegation of  human rights abuses. 
Sections 1504 and 1502 require companies to provide this type of  infor-
mation. According to Calvert Investments and the Social Investment Fo-
rum, information disclosed through section 1504: 
should enable investors to have enhanced confidence in manage-
ment’s guidance regarding future production and should attract as-
sets from long-term equity investors to compliant issuers, which 
should provide greater stability to an issuer’s asset base and enable 
management to make forward-thinking decisions in the interest of  
investors with the confidence that the outcomes of  those decisions 
will be judged over long-term investment horizons.101 
In addition, information disclosed through section 1502, including the po-
tential hidden risks in companies’ supply chains, provides investors with 
the transparency necessary to protect their investments. Because existing 
data is not reliable, comprehensive, standardized, or consistent across 
companies, government-mandated disclosure is necessary.  
The case for disclosure of  human rights-related risks compares to that 
for political spending, on which the SEC is considering whether to pro-
pose a new rule.102 In their influential article that puts forward a case for 
an SEC rule on corporate political spending, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Rob-
ert J. Jackson, Jr. argue that shareholders have significant interest in receiv-
ing information about such spending.103 Their evidence includes investors’ 
extensive use of  shareholder proposals requesting disclosure of  corporate 
spending on politics. We can apply the same measure to gauge investor 
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interest in human rights. During the 2011 proxy season, 44 shareholder 
proposals were categorized in the areas of  labor and human rights and 36 
proposals concerned sustainability.104 The total number combined (80 
proposals) compares to the number of  proposals on political spending in 
2011, which was 82.105 As Bebchuk and Jackson note, the SEC has previ-
ously taken the frequency of  shareholder proposals into account when it 
considered changing its executive compensation disclosure requirements in 
1992.106 
The SEC has the authority to promulgate social disclosure rules “if  a 
significant minority of  investors’ priorities have expanded to include a 
concern with the social and environmental effects of  the companies in 
which they invest.”107 I argue that the “reasonable investor” has evolved 
and now finds this information material. Moreover, given the international 
legal regime that holds companies responsible for respecting human 
rights,108 disclosure falls within the category of  a company’s efforts to 
comply with the law.109  
1. The Need for Disclosure Guidance on Existing Rules 
If  it is appropriate for the SEC to require disclosure on human rights-
related risks, by what mechanism should it do so? Should it require a spe-
cialized disclosure requiring supply chain due diligence, as is mandated by 
section 1502 with regard to conflict minerals? I argue that section 1502 is 
not the model for more expanded human rights-related disclosure at the 
SEC. A more effective mechanism that addresses company concerns and is 
less likely to be challenged in courts is the development and publication of  
interpretive guidance on existing rules — following the model of  recent 
disclosure guidance on climate change and cybersecurity risks.110 
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Section 1502’s tenuous connection to the SEC’s mandate and the exor-
bitant costs that companies will face under the regulation suggests that this 
is not a practical model for future human rights disclosure. Critics of  the 
SEC’s authority to adopt section 1502 note that investor protection was 
not the primary purpose behind the Dodd–Frank provision. The SEC rec-
ognizes that its authority is based on a congressional mandate to help end 
the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, but it also acknowledges that the dis-
closed information may be material to investors in their decision-making. 
The final rule states: 
[U]nlike in most of  the securities laws, Congress intended the Con-
flicts Mineral Provision to serve a humanitarian purpose, which is 
to prevent armed groups from benefiting from the trade of  conflict 
minerals. There may also be a benefit to investors given the view 
expressed by some commentators that the provision also protects 
investors by requiring disclosure of  information that may be mate-
rial to their understanding of  the risks of  investing in an issuer or 
its supply chain. To the extent that the required disclosure will help 
investors in pricing the securities of  the issuers subject to the Con-
flict Minerals Statutory Provision, the rule could improve informa-
tional efficiency.111 
One could argue that under section 14(a) of  the Securities Exchange Act 
of  1934, the SEC can promulgate disclosure rules not only on information 
for the protection of  investors, but also on information in the public inter-
est since it impacts shareholder value.112 In this case, one issue of  public 
concern is the ongoing conflict in the DRC, which presents potential repu-
tational and financial risks to companies that are unknowingly sourcing 
conflict minerals from war zones.113 Another issue of  public interest is the 
promotion of  greater public accountability of  corporate managers, which 
the SEC has used as a rationale for previous disclosure requirements.114 
Cynthia Williams, who authored an influential article in this area, argues 
that expanded social disclosure as a mechanism for corporate accountabil-
ity is consistent with the SEC’s public interest disclosure power granted 
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under section 14(a), which is distinct from its investor protection grant of  
power under that section.115  
Consistency with the SEC’s public interest disclosure power and a con-
gressional mandate, however, may not be enough to save section 1502 or 
similar provisions in the future. Current litigation by the U.S. Chamber of  
Commerce, the National Association of  Manufacturers, and Business 
Roundtable challenges the rule and argues that the SEC violated its duty to 
conduct an adequate economic analysis. The parties cite the enormous 
compliance costs associated with section 1502 and the agency’s inability to 
quantify the rule’s benefits for the Congolese people.116 They rely on the 
U.S. Court of  Appeals for the District of  Columbia Circuit’s recent deci-
sion in Business Roundtable v. SEC (as well as a ten-year line of  earlier appel-
late decisions), which raised the bar for economic analysis in rulemaking.117 
In that case, the court struck down the agency’s proxy access rule for fail-
ing “adequately to assess the economic consequences” of  the rule.118 The 
court relied on the statutory requirement that the SEC had to consider, 
along with the protection of  investors and whether an action will promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation when it adopts rules of  the 
public interest.119 In response to the case and congressional concerns, the 
agency issued staff  guidance that highlights the rigorous economic analysis 
that future rules will be subject to.120 
Following Business Roundtable, the SEC faces a significant analytical bur-
den in future rulemaking.121 It is unlikely that the agency will adopt new 
disclosure rules that are too costly for businesses and whose benefits are 
not easily quantifiable. Extending section 1502’s supply chain due diligence 
requirement to all companies — not just those that possibly manufacture 
minerals originating in the DRC or its neighbors, or even just to those 
companies that source minerals from conflict zones — would impose a 
significant financial burden on them and would require companies to apply 
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a process where the standards and procedures are still under development. 
What companies instead need is guidance on how to conduct analysis on 
human rights risks and identify those risks that are material to investors.  
Therefore, I recommend that the SEC take a more conservative ap-
proach by releasing interpretive guidance that clarifies companies’ existing 
obligations to disclose human rights-related material risks under Item 
503(c) (Risk Factors) of  Regulation S-K; Item 103 (Legal Proceedings); 
and Item 303 (Management's Discussion and Analysis). Such guidance 
would not change the current “materiality” standard, but instead would 
outline possible human rights risks (e.g., labor practices, working condi-
tions, and human rights abuses) that companies should report in their 10-
Ks. There is precedent for the SEC to issue this type of  guidance, as it has 
recently done with respect to climate change and cybersecurity risks.122 
Interpretive guidance on risks related to human rights would clarify ex-
isting rules and would thus not require a cost-benefit analysis that could be 
challenged in court. In order to standardize the information presented to 
investors and avoid boilerplate discussion, the guidance could also include 
a set of  key performance indicators that are material to investors.123 The 
SEC could draw from the sustainability accounting standards being devel-
oped by the newly established Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, 
which is compiling industry-specific performance indicators and manage-
ment disclosures for use in securities filings.124 By issuing disclosure guid-
ance, the SEC would also be responding to ongoing pressure from invest-
ment groups who have requested comprehensive, comparable data 
through sustainability reporting.125  
2. The Costs of  Not Reporting 
In the long term, there may be greater costs to companies from not re-
porting human rights risks and taking steps to mitigate human rights abus-
es, particularly in conflict-affected areas. These costs range from reputa-
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tional damage that can affect a company’s share price to the denial of  a 
“social license” to operate by local communities and civil society groups.126 
Companies are increasingly dependent on third-party suppliers or local 
subsidiaries, whose potential contribution to human rights violations, if  
undetected or unresolved, could significantly impact a company’s reputa-
tion, brand image, and sales. Take the case of  Apple Inc., which was sub-
ject to harsh criticism beginning in 2010 for labor rights violations and a 
string of  suicides at its Chinese contractor Foxconn.127 Because of  the 
damage to its reputation (and therefore a likely concern about its share 
price), Apple hired the non-profit Fair Labor Association to audit working 
conditions at Foxconn with the goal of  improving working conditions.128 
Yet companies need to audit not only their supply chains but also their 
operations to ensure that they are not unwittingly condoning human rights 
abuses by their own employees. The BP oil disaster is an example of  the 
high costs of  neglecting worker safety and environmental standards.129 
Moreover, companies that fail to disclose their social performance and 
do not take steps to comply with human rights and environmental norms 
may be denied a social license to operate by civil society groups and com-
munity members in host country governments.130 A “social license” means 
that companies “are constrained to meet the expectations of  society and 
avoid activities that societies (or influential elements within them) deem 
unacceptable.”131 It is especially important for extractive companies to ob-
tain a social license when they operate in countries with weak governments 
that provide insufficient public services to their citizens. Obtaining a social 
license to operate from a community means engaging in meaningful con-
sultation and getting community buy-in prior to the commencement of  a 
project. Without community support, “informal economic sanctions” (e.g., 
demonstrations, blockades, civil unrest, and political opposition) can tran-
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spire, which significantly slow a project down or even threaten its contin-
ued operations.132 Therefore, it is necessary for a company to manage pos-
sible human rights risks in order to maintain its long-term competitive ad-
vantage and reputation, and thereby minimize its economic costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The intersection between human rights and securities regulation uncov-
ers the social dimensions of  securities law as well as the corporatization of  
human rights law. Given the materiality of  human rights-related risks, cur-
rent regulatory frameworks would permit companies to disclose this in-
formation in their securities filings. Key performance indicators could clar-
ify the material issues for each sector and improve companies’ ability and 
willingness to report on their performance. But an important question re-
mains: How can we address possible damage to a company’s competitive 
advantage due to increased costs associated with social disclosure?  
In order to relieve company concerns over a potential loss of  competi-
tive advantage, I argue that we need international regulatory convergence 
around social, and particularly human rights, disclosure. Within the spec-
trum of  international coordination approaches around international secu-
rities law, scholars have debated the costs and benefits of  regulatory com-
petition versus regulatory cooperation, including convergence.133 Under a 
regulatory competition approach, countries adopt distinct systems of  secu-
rities regulation on which they compete to attract investors and other mar-
ket participants.134 Regulatory convergence, in contrast, means that coun-
tries develop similar systems of  securities regulation. Following the recent 
global financial crisis, there have been renewed calls to facilitate cross-
border cooperation through the setting of  common rules and standards, 
information-sharing, and collaboration on supervision.135 
International convergence may not be appropriate for all securities regu-
lations, but it is essential for those that require global coordination — such 
as laws seeking to prevent human rights violations in corporate supply 
chains — and for those regulations that would bring about a competitive 
disadvantage to companies if  only applied in one country. While rules such 
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as Dodd–Frank section 1502 have the potential to enhance such goals as 
global supply chain transparency, their effectiveness is curtailed by their 
limited applicability to companies listed in the United States. Countries 
should develop common standards that would require all companies to 
provide consistent and comparable information on material human rights 
risks. Such convergence is already in demand by investors with global port-
folios and multinational companies seeking a standardized system of  re-
porting. As financial reporting standards converge across world markets, 
requirements for human rights disclosure among companies should follow 
suit. 
 
